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This is about getting Trenton the hell out of the business of telling
people how many units they’re supposed to have—some arbitrary,
ridiculous formula that nobody could ever explain.1
– New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, on his efforts to dismantle
the Mount Laurel doctrine
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1. Lisa Fleisher, Gov. Chris Christie Proposes Eliminating Affordable Housing
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INTRODUCTION

Mount Laurel is in trouble—again. But has there ever been a time
when this statement has not been true? The Mount Laurel doctrine
seems perennially hovering on the brink of extinction. It was
surrounded by controversy when it was finally made effective with a
“builder’s remedy” in 1983,2 and it barely survived its transition to
statutory implementation in the form of the New Jersey Fair Housing
Act in 1985. Both Governors James McGreevey, a Democrat, and
Chris Christie, a Republican, made open war on it.3 Governor
Christie has gone so far as to attempt to abolish by executive order
the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), Mount Laurel’s
statutorily created guardian.4 COAH itself has attempted to weaken
the doctrine with a “growth share” definition of the “fair share”
obligation that the New Jersey appellate division has ruled illegally
weak.5
Yet Mount Laurel stubbornly draws breath, albeit on life support:
Despite the important constituencies in New Jersey that would like to
pull the plug, there are other constituencies that stop the euthanizing
of the doctrine. The State Assembly, controlled by Democrats with
leadership from New Jersey’s impoverished cities, has refused to let
Governor Christie gut the doctrine with his own version of “growth
share,”6 and the New Jersey state courts doggedly resist Governor
Christie’s efforts to dismantle COAH or municipalities’ “fair share”
obligation. 7
It is an oddity when a legal doctrine cannot settle down to a
comfortable middle age after thirty years of turmoil. One might
impatiently say about Mount Laurel what Oscar Wilde’s Lady
2. On the controversy associated with the “builder’s remedy,” see John M.
Payne, Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of Mount Laurel II, 3 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 555, 563–64 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties of
Social Policy in a Time of Retrenchment, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 852, 855 (2011)
(on the opposition of James McGreevey and Chris Christie to Mount Laurel).
4. See Salvador Rizzo, N.J. Supreme Court Blocks Christie’s Plan to Abolish
Affordable-Housing Agency, NJ.COM (July 10, 2013), http://www.nj.com/politics/
index.ssf/2013/07/nj_supreme_court_blocks_christies_plan_to_abolish_affordablehousing_agency.html.
5. See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 by the N.J. Council on Affordable
Hous., 914 A.2d 348, 363–64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) [hereinafter In re
Adoption of 5:94 & 5:95].
6. See Mallach, supra note 3, at 857–58.
7. See, e.g., In re Plan for Abolition of Council on Affordable Hous., 70 A.3d
559 (N.J. 2013).
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Bracknell said about Algernon’s fictional friend Bunbury in The
Importance of Being Earnest: “It is high time that [Mount Laurel]
made up [its] mind whether [it] is going to live or to die. This shillyshallying with the question is absurd.”8
Why cannot Mount Laurel make up its mind whether it is going to
live or die? The dilemma arises from Mount Laurel’s serving a
genuine need in a clumsy way. On one hand, as I explain in Part I,
the doctrine helps New Jersey’s 566 municipalities and townships
overcome collective action problems that otherwise might excessively
impede an adequate supply of housing.9 On the other hand, the
specific design of the doctrine—in particular, the assignment of
specific numbers of housing units to particular municipalities—
undermines the doctrine’s effectiveness as a device for overcoming
these collective action problems. As I suggest in Part II, this “unitbased” rule—that is, a rule that assigns housing units to particular
jurisdictions—places extraordinary informational burdens on judges
and bureaucrats, because such a rule forces public officials to do the
job of siting housing, a task usually reserved for housing markets
rather than law.10 Because the data and siting criteria are so
controversial, unit-based doctrines invite maximum homeowner
resistance, as each suburban and rural jurisdiction vies with each
other to skew the contestable formulae in their own favor. Inner-ring
suburbs, for instance, will want to emphasize “buildable land,” as a
factor for siting affordable housing, while rural townships will want to
encourage infill and redevelopment. This bureaucratic and legislative
infighting reproduce the very collective action problem that Mount
Laurel was supposed to solve. In this sense, Mount Laurel has
created, in Governor Christie’s pungent phrase, “some arbitrary,
ridiculous formula that nobody could ever explain,” because the
Mount Laurel formula does not reassure each homeowner that they
are being treated fairly—a major point of any “fair share” doctrine.
In Part III, I will suggest that these informational burdens and, less
confidently, the political controversy, might be mitigated by
supplementing or even replacing Mount Laurel’s unit-based rule with
a doctrine targeting zoning restrictions.11 In particular, I will suggest

8. OSCAR WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST 13 (Kenneth McLeish et
al. eds., Nick Hern Books 1995) (1898).
9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
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that state law might impose on every municipality a minimum zoned
residential density to eliminate excessive restriction of multi-family
and other forms of “least-cost housing”—that is, housing that uses the
smallest marketable amount of land and materials to construct. The
point of this density requirement would not be to second-guess
housing markets by siting units in particular jurisdictions, but instead
to create a sufficient reserve of zoning entitlements so that builders
could decide where housing could be most profitably produced in
response to consumer demand. By removing regulatory barriers to
housing supply, this revised doctrine would alleviate the problem of
housing affordability without dictating to the market where housing
ought to be located.
Using “anti-snob zoning” statutes in
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island as rough models, I will
suggest that Mount Laurel might face less opposition if it focused less
on fixing the precise number of units to be allocated to each
municipality and more on forcing municipalities to justify the
exorbitant quantities of land that they require per dwelling unit.
I. THE NEED FOR MOUNT LAUREL: MUNICIPAL COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS
Consider, first, how “affordable housing”—meaning, for the
purposes of this Essay, housing priced at less than the price of the
median residential structure in the municipality where the housing is
located—gives rise to a collective action problem. The problem arises
from a conflict between affordable housing’s local costs and regional
benefits. On the one hand, affordable housing imposes uncertain
local fiscal, political, and social costs on municipalities that host it.
The fiscal cost results from affordable housing’s being liable for lower
ad valorem property taxes than the median structure, allowing the
former’s occupants to consume the same level of services for a lower
tax price than that paid by the occupants of median-valued housing.
This effective redistribution of wealth from high-valued to low-valued
property will be capitalized into the price of both, raising the price of
the latter, lowering the price of the former, and reducing the tax
revenue available to both for local services.12 The political cost arises
from correlation of tastes for local public goods with income.
Assuming that services like parks and recreation, education, and

12. Stephen M. Calabrese et al., Inefficiencies from Metropolitan Political and
Fiscal Decentralization: Failures of Tiebout Competition, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 1081,
1102–04 (2012).
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environmental enhancement are normal goods, demand should rise
with income, leading to conflicts between different socio-economic
groups about their local government’s spending priorities. Economic
heterogeneity leads to ideological heterogeneity, which, in turn, leads
to fights that undermine the trust needed for political cooperation.13
Finally, affordable housing can have social costs to the extent that it is
occupied by very poor households with unstable family structures;
both crime and low educational achievement are correlated with
either concentrated poverty of a neighborhood or parental instability
associated with such poverty.14
Exclusionary zoning is a rational way for individual municipalities
to reduce the risks of these fiscal, political, and social costs. By
requiring residents to purchase an identically valued structure on
which a uniform tax rate is levied, such zoning transforms the ad
valorem property tax into a lump-sum fee, insuring that each resident
pays the same amount in taxes, receives the same package of services,
and thereby reveals by their migration to the municipality that they
value the services at the taxes charged.15 Uniformity of housing type
promotes uniformity of income and, thus, uniformity of demands for
social services. The exclusion of poor households is also a heartless
but effective way for higher-income groups to insulate themselves
from the social costs of poverty.

13. See DAVID E. CAMPBELL, WHY WE VOTE: HOW SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES
SHAPE OUR CIVIC LIFE 50–75 (2006) (describing relationship between ideological
homogeneity and social trust); MARION ORR, BLACK SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE POLITICS
OF SCHOOL REFORM IN BALTIMORE, 1986–1998, at 140–41 (1999) (describing how
inter-ethnic strife distracted from Baltimore schools’ educational mission); Robert D.
Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century,
30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 142–43 (2007) (describing relationship between
ideological homogeneity and social trust).
14. Compare Robert J. Sampson, Crime and Public Safety: Insights from
Community-Level Perspectives on Social Capital, in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND POOR
COMMUNITIES 89 (Susan Saegert et al. eds., 2001) (arguing that concentrated poverty
within a neighborhood leads to higher crime and lower educational achievement),
with Philip Orepoulos, The Long-Run Consequences of Living in a Poor
Neighborhood, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1533 (2003) (arguing that poverty of household rather
than neighborhood leads to crime and lower educational achievement). On the
effects of parental instability and single-parent households on child welfare and
behavior problems, see Terry-Ann Craigie et al., Fragile Families and Child
Wellbeing, 20 FUTURE OF CHILD. 87 (2010).
15. Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local
Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 207 (1975). Calabrese, Epple and Romano suggest
that household heterogeneity and lot-size heterogeneity will likely persist even with
exclusionary zoning. Calabrese et al., supra note 12, at 1109.
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The solution of exclusion, however, has regional costs that
individual municipalities are likely to discount or ignore. The coexistence of households with different incomes can produce benefits
for all income groups—jobs for poorer households, workers for richer
municipalities, and various agglomeration benefits from denser
housing that permits multiple employers to locate in the same
community.16 Low-income households can avoid neighborhood
violence and increase their income and employment by residing in a
community with higher median household income.17 Moreover, lowincome households can gain these benefits at little cost to the
neighbors if the number of affordable dwelling units is small.
Consider, for instance, Ethel R. Lawrence Homes (ERLH), the
residential development built as a result the original Mount Laurel
litigation. ERLH contains only 140 dwelling units,18 a tiny number
compared to Mount Laurel Township’s 18,249 dwelling units
reflected in the 2010 census.19 Len Albright, Elizabeth Derickson,
and Douglas Massey found ERLH had no effect on Mount Laurel’s
crime, property values or taxes when Mount Laurel was compared to

16. See David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1507, 1507 on the tension between sorting households based on their
preference for local public goods and agglomerating different sorts of firms together
to produce beneficial interaction among them. See id. at 1529 for a discussion of the
tension between sorting households based on their preference for local public goods
and agglomerating different sorts of firms together to produce beneficial interaction
among them.
17. Douglas S. Massey, Lessons from Mount Laurel: The Benefits of Affordable
Housing for All Concerned, POVERTY & RACE RES. ACTION COUNCIL (May/June
2012),
http://prrac.org/full_text.php?item_id=13429&newsletter_id=123&header=Current%
20Projects. Len Albright, Elizabeth Derickson, and Douglas Massey found that the
occupants of Ethel Lawrence Homes reaped substantial benefits from living in
Mount Laurel in terms of higher employment, less exposure to violence, greater total
income, and lower rates of welfare dependency when compared to similar residents
in communities with a larger share of low-income households. Len Albright et al., Do
Affordable Housing Projects Harm Suburban Communities? Crime, Property
Values, and Property Taxes in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey 27–28 (June 15, 2011)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1865231.
18. See Ethel R. Lawrence Homes, FAIR SHARE HOUS. DEV.,
http://fairsharedevelopment.org/housing/development/ethel-lawrence/ (last visited
Sept. 16, 2013).
19. Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics, Mount Laurel
Township, Burlington County, New Jersey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml#none (search
“Mount Laurel Township, Burlington County, New Jersey”; then follow “Housing”
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
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a matched set of neighboring townships.20 Indeed, in a survey
conducted by Massey and his colleagues, one-third of the neighbors
did not even know affordable housing existed in the neighborhood,
and, among those who did know, only forty percent could successfully
name the project.21
Individual municipalities will often ignore these benefits of
affordable housing. Each municipality does not internalize the
benefits that their affordable housing confers on neighboring
employers, because the employees who work for neighboring
municipalities’ employers can take advantage of such housing even if
those employees cross a municipal border when commuting to work.22
A similar incentive for free-riding arises among affluent communities
with altruistic preferences. Even if each wealthy community wanted
low-income households to benefit from integrated schools and
residential markets, they would nevertheless have an incentive to
free-ride off of neighboring communities’ efforts to provide these
benefits. The collective problem is exacerbated by uncertainty. A
small amount of affordable housing might be costless—but how small
is small enough? Neighbors whose largest investment consists of the
down payment on their owner-occupied home are likely to be riskaverse in calculating the safe number of dwelling units.23 This anxiety
about setting the number of dwelling units too high is exacerbated by
the collective action problems faced by individual households trying
to anticipate whether their neighborhood’s social-economic
composition will rapidly change because their neighbors will sell.24

20. Albright et al., supra note 17, (manuscript at 27).
21. Massey, supra note 17.
22. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Political Structure and Exclusionary Zoning: Are
Small Suburbs the Big Problem?, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND LAND POLICIES
111, 130–31 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2008).
23. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME
VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LANDUSE POLICIES 8–10, 268–69 (2001).
24. For Thomas Schelling’s classic account of how individual households face a
collective action problem in determining whether a neighborhood will maintain an
ideal racial or social composition, see Thomas C. Schelling, A Process of Residential
Segregation: Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE
157 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972). For evidence that fear of neighborhood
unraveling continues to make stable racial integration challenging, see INGRID
GOULD ELLEN, SHARING AMERICA’S NEIGHBORHOODS: THE PROSPECTS FOR STABLE
RACIAL INTEGRATION (2000).
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Each municipality is, therefore, trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma in
which it is always rational to exclude affordable housing regardless of
whether neighboring municipalities host such housing (in which case
exclusive communities will reap the regional benefits without the
attendant local risks) or exclude it (in which case exclusive
communities will avoid being the sole site for the region’s affordable
housing).
II. THE PROBLEM WITH MOUNT LAUREL: INFORMATIONAL
BURDENS OF THE UNIT-BASED APPROACH
Given the strategic bind in which each municipality finds itself
when it tries to accommodate affordable housing, one might think
that Mount Laurel would be welcomed by the suburbs as a way of
freeing them from the risk of bearing a disproportionate share of lowincome households. Moreover, because the effects of housing
heterogeneity could be anticipated by homebuyers, Mount Laurel can
perform this coordinating function with a very modest redistribution
of wealth. While buyers of more expensive structures could be
expected to bid less as a result of Mount Laurel, buyers of cheaper
structure would bid more, anticipating good services at the cost of a
lower tax bill.25 The redistributive effect of Mount Laurel is
dampened not only by the magic of capitalization but also by the New
Jersey Appellate Division’s moderation in pursuit of equality, such as
the court’s exclusion of cost-burdened households from the definition
of “present regional need” for affordable housing.26
Yet Mount Laurel and its implementation through the New Jersey
Fair Housing Act have attracted apparently endless suburban anger

25. Bruce W. Hamilton, Capitalization of Intrajurisdictional Differences in Local
Tax Prices, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 743 (1976).
26. The COAH’s “second round” rules excluded “cost-burdened” households—
meaning low- and moderate-income households paying more than fifty percent of
their gross income on housing—from the definition of “present regional need,”
thereby substantially lowering the total number of housing units that each region
would have to supply. Given that overcrowded housing counts as part of this
“present need,” the exclusion of cost-burdened household might seem to be
irrational, because a cost-burdened household could convert to an overcrowded
household simply by spending less on rent and more on food, clothing, and
transportation. The Appellate Division upheld COAH’s definition, however, on the
prudential ground that otherwise the number of affordable units required to meet
present need would be too large. In re Adoption of 5:94 & 5:95, supra note 5, at 369
(noting that 636,000 households were cost-burdened, requiring 260,000 new marketrate units to be constructed per decade with twenty percent set aside as affordable
units).
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from the moment Chief Justice Wilentz imposed the “builder’s
remedy” to make Mount Laurel effective.27 Why the fuss, when the
doctrine seems to help the protesting municipalities escape from a
collective action dilemma?
I suggest that Mount Laurel’s effort to assign specific numbers of
housing units to particular jurisdictions—what I call a “unit-based”
approach to exclusionary zoning – creates problems for the doctrine.
This unit-based approach creates two difficulties that make the
doctrine inspire political controversy. First, as a pragmatically
empirical matter, the unit-based approach places heavy informational
burdens on public officials that they cannot easily discharge to the
satisfaction of politicians. Second, the unit-based approach takes the
focus off policies that municipalities fully control—the restrictiveness
of their zoning rules—and instead concentrates on housing
production and price, policy outcomes that are mostly the product of
household wealth and consumer demand outside of municipal power.
Such a refocusing on bad private economic conditions (poverty and
high land rents from escalating private demand) naturally gives rise to
the question: “Why are municipalities being charged with the duty of
banishing poverty?” It makes more sense to focus instead on the
question, “why are municipalities exacerbating poverty with overly
restrictive land-use rules?”
The first complaint against unit-based approaches is familiar not
only from statements by Mount Laurel’s critics but also those of its
supporters. As the late Professor John Payne observed, the formulae
used to implement Mount Laurel “became almost impossible to
explain succinctly to lay audiences.”28 David Kinsey essentially restated Governor Christie’s criticism of Mount Laurel more
diplomatically when Kinsey wrote that the unit-based approach (or
what Kinsey called “the formulaic approach”) “produced confusion
and cynicism due to its complexity and opacity, and consequently
failed to rally the political support needed to sustain an unpopular,

27. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 452–53 (N.J.
1983). Southern Burlington is frequently cited as Mount Laurel II. E.g., John M.
Pyane, Politics, Exclusionary Zoning and Robert Wilentz, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 689,
689 n.1 (1997). On the ineffectiveness of Mount Laurel prior to the builder’s
remedy—basically, a writ of mandamus entitling the plaintiff to a building permit—
and the suburban outrage that the builder’s remedy provoked, see DAVID L. KIRP ET
AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING AND THE SOUL OF SUBURBIA, 85–92, 121–27 (1995).
28. John M. Payne, The Paradox of Progress: Three Decades of Mount Laurel
Doctrine, 5 J. PLAN. HIST. 126, 132 (2006).
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judicially driven policy that interfered with local land use
prerogatives.”29
COAH’s initial effort to carry out a unit-based approach to Mount
Laurel took the form of rules implementing the New Jersey Fair
Housing Act,30 rules largely based on the formulae devised in turn by
the three “Mount Laurel judges” selected by Chief Justice Wilentz31—
in particular, Justice Serpentelli’s decision in AMG Realty Co. v.
Township of Warren.32 This AMG Realty formula bases municipal
fair shares on each municipality’s share of a region’s buildable land,
employment, regional income, and substandard housing.33 The data
required by this multi-factored assignment of units to places is
enormous, including (in Kinsey’s catalogue) “journey-to-work
patterns existing housing quality . . . housing rehabilitation, household
income, population projections, headship rates, household formation
projections, housing price filtering, residential conversions, housing
demolitions, equalized nonresidential property valuation (ratables),
and undeveloped land.”34
Aside from this voracious appetite for disputable data, AMG
Realty’s criteria contain contestable policy assumptions about where
housing ought to be located, assumptions that neither the courts nor
COAH have bothered to defend. Why, for instance, base fair shares
of housing on the municipality’s share of buildable land in a region?
Demolition and vertical construction obviously allow a built-out
municipality to increase its residential densities. Building denser
structures in municipalities with less land might make more sense
than spreading out low-density developments in more rural areas.
AMG Realty implicitly assumes without comment, however, that the
existing low-density use of parcels can trump the need for affordable
housing. Low-density suburban jurisdictions like Cherry Hill, which
contains only 1.7 dwelling units per acre, exploit this vacant land
29. David N. Kinsey, The Growth Share Approach to Mount Laurel Housing
Obligations: Origins, Hijacking, and Future, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 869 (2011).
30. For COAH’s basic method for calculating municipal “fair shares” under its
“first round” and “second round” of rules, see N. J. ADMIN. CODE 5 § 93-2.1 (2001).
31. The three judges and their formulae were Steven Skillman, who wrote
Countryside Props. v. Mayor and Council of Ringwood, 500 A.2d 767, 769 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); L. Anthony Gibson, who wrote Van Dalen v. Washington
Twp., 500 A.2d 776, 779–80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); and Eugene Serpentelli,
who wrote AMG Realty Co. v. Twp. of Warren, 504 A.2d 692, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1984).
32. AMG Realty, 504 A.2d at 727.
33. See generally AMG Realty, 504 A.2d 692.
34. Kinsey, supra note 29, at 869.
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factor to reduce their “fair share” on the ground that their territory is
already occupied by detached single-family homes—as if, somehow, a
multi-family structure cannot replace an existing low-density or nonresidential building.35
By contrast, the AMG Realty formula
originally did not directly consider each municipality’s share of the
regional property tax base in calculating fair shares, an omission that
seems puzzling given that Mount Laurel was expressly designed to
counteract municipal incentives to exclude housing for fiscal
reasons.36 (Share of regional employment, which AMG Realty does
include in its “fair share” formula, constitutes only an imperfect proxy
for tax base, given that some employers—non-profit universities and
government, for instance—are tax-exempt). Again, neither AMG
Realty nor Mount Laurel explains this decision.
Because the data selected as relevant by AMG Realty is so dense,
courts and bureaucrats must rely on crude proxies, slight
modifications of which can have dramatic effects on the number of
affordable units that a jurisdiction is obliged to host. Consider, for
instance, COAH’s varying definitions of “substandard housing”: in its
Second and Third Rounds of rules, COAH relied on different census
proxies37 to define “substandard housing” that radically reduced the
present need for housing from 60,281 units38 to 24,847 units.39 As one
would expect, the appellate division largely upheld these changes
based on deference to “COAH’s broad discretion in selecting an

35. See CHERRY HILL TWP. PLANNING BD., MASTER PLAN 2003, at 190, 202
(2003), available at http://www.cherryhill-nj.com/DocumentCenter/Home/View/437.
36. The omission of tax base share was remedied in 1993. See Substantive Rules
of The New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing for the Period Beginning June 6,
1994, N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:93 (2011).
37. COAH’s second round rules used seven “surrogates” from the 1990 Census to
approximate the number of deficient or dilapidated housing units, with two proxies
indicating a deficient unit. The seven surrogates were (1) units built prior to 1940; (2)
overcrowded units, that is, units having 1.01 or more persons per room; (3)
inadequate plumbing; (4) inadequate kitchen facilities; (5) inadequate heating fuel,
that is, no fuel at all or using coal or wood; (6) inadequate sewer services; and (7)
inadequate water supply. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:93 app. A, at 93-50. COAH’s Third
Round rules, however, used only three surrogates for dilapidated housing, consisting
of (1) overcrowded units built prior to 1940; (2) units lacking adequate plumbing
facilities; and (3) units lacking adequate kitchen facilities. Likewise, the Third Round
rules reduced certain towns’ obligation by subtracting numbers for “spontaneous
rehabilitation” of housing from those towns’ numbers. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:94 app.
a, at 94-33.
38. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:93 app. a, at 93-52.
39. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:94 app. a, tbl.4, at 94-36.
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appropriate methodology.”40 Such broad discretion is unavoidable
when the informational demands of the doctrine dwarf the capacity of
a court to evaluate or find alternative data to those which the agency
selects.
Efforts to simplify the unit-based approach have failed, because the
problems with the approach are endemic to the challenge of assigning
housing to particular jurisdictions. Recognizing that the complexity
of unit-based formulae endangered Mount Laurel’s legitimacy and
predictability, some of Mount Laurel’s supporters initially pressed in
the 1990s for some version of “growth share” by which to assign units
to jurisdictions.41 The general idea of “growth share” is that
municipalities should require some number of affordable units to be
built in some fixed ratio to new market-rate housing units or new
commercial square footage.42 The most frequently used ratio, for
instance, would require twenty percent of all new market-rate
housing or one affordable unit for every 2000 square feet of new
nonresidential space to be set aside for low- and moderate-income
housing.43
Growth share is allegedly an improvement on AMG Realty,
because it seems to give municipalities the option not to build any
affordable housing if they decide not to issue any new building
permits, thereby placating environmentalists dismayed at the
countryside’s being eaten up by Mount Laurel obligations.44 At the
same time—and contradictorily—advocates of affordable housing
believed that properly designed growth share ratios would not induce
municipalities simply to ban all growth as a way to exclude affordable
housing, because it is in their interest to “accommodate some growth
or redevelopment” given that “local governments in New Jersey are
heavily dependent on property tax ratables.”45
Growth share, therefore, involves the same empirically intractable
balancing of rival values as AMG Realty. Growth share ratios
require a subtle balancing of municipal incentives for tax revenues
and developers’ incentives for market-based units against the costs
40. See In re Adoption of 5:94 & 5:95, supra note 5, at 371.
41. John Payne was an early supporter of growth share. See, e.g., John M. Payne,
Remedies For Affordable Housing: From Fair Share To Growth Share, 49 LAND USE
& ZONING DIG. 6, 3–9 (1997).
42. Id.
43. See Payne, supra note 28, at 136; see also Kinsey, supra note 29, at 871.
44. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, New Jersey’s Housing Law Works Too Well, Some
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3 2001, at A1.
45. Payne, supra note 28, at 139.
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(perceived and real) of affordable units for both developers asked to
build them and municipalities asked to host them. If the shares of
affordable units are set too high, then developers might build nothing,
leaving low- and moderate-income households worse off, because
new market-rate units contribute to the downward filtering of existing
housing to less wealthy occupants.46 Likewise, municipalities might
calculate that the tax revenues generated by market-rate residential
units are not sufficient to cover the costs of services to the affordable
units, inducing them to favor commercial over residential
development and thereby also reducing the downward filtering of
existing housing.47 The Appellate Division has recognized that
growth share is a covertly exclusionary device unless the ratios of
market-rate to affordable growth actually encourage sufficient
market-rate growth with density bonuses.48 If the density bonuses
46. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of “Inclusionary” Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L REV.
1167 (1981) argues that inclusionary requirements can actually be exclusionary
devices, to the extent that developers do not gain extra development rights from
inclusionary units sufficient to cover those units’ costs, because the units constructed
as a result of the inclusionary requirement might be more than offset by the units lost
as a result of reduced filtering. Ellickson’s argument against inclusionary zoning has
attracted a lot of criticism. See, e.g., Andrew G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market:
The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23 (1996);
Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a Renewed Look at Its
Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539 (1995); Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In
Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F.
L. REV. 971 (2002). For a defense of Ellickson’s argument and response to critics, see
Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, “The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning
Reclaimed”: How Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 471 (2005).
As Powell and Stringham note, there is wide consensus in the economic literature
that used and new housing compete with each other to some extent in most housing
markets, such that the latter cause the former to filter downwards at some varying
rate, depending on the structure of local housing demand. See, e.g., Richard Green,

Metropolitan-Specific Estimates of the Price Elasticity of Supply of Housing, and
Their Sources, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 2, 336 (2005).
47. For an example of a fiscal impact analysis recommending precisely such a
choice of commercial over residential development to fund Mount Laurel units, see
PETER G. STECK, FISCAL IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT LOTS 2
& 3 IN BLOCK 2802, GRAND AVENUE WEST, MERCEDES DRIVE & PHILLIPS PKWY AND
FOR MT. LAUREL HOUSING, LOTS 3 & 5 IN BLOCK 1002, SUMMIT AVENUE, BOROUGH
MONTVALE
(2013),
available
at
OF
http://www.montvale.org/files/MontvaleHekFiscal6.pdf.
48. In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, by the N.J. Council On Affordable
Hous., 6 A.3d 445, 461 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) [hereinafter In re Adoption
of 5:96 & 5:97] (“Permitting municipalities to demand that developers build
affordable housing without any additional incentives provides municipalities with an
effective tool to exclude the poor by combining an affordable housing requirement
with large-lot zoning . . . . A regulatory regime that relies on developers to incur the
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become too large, however, then they risk inspiring a popular
backlash against Mount Laurel by local lovers of open space objecting
to the development of neighboring countryside by thousands of
market-rate units required to finance relatively small number of
affordable units.49 Rigid growth share ratios that do not adjust with
downturns in the real estate market can operate as de facto bans on
new housing.50 Yet such flexible adjustment of the ratios would not
likely be forthcoming from slow-moving bureaucratic or political
actors, some of whom might be all too happy to exclude all new
housing with an apparently generous growth share ratio.
Apart from these intractable empirical problems, there is a
normative or conceptual difficulty with growth share: Like any other
unit-based approach to exclusionary zoning, growth share offers a
formula for siting affordable housing without much normative
explanation to justify its siting criteria. Why exactly should growing
communities be more responsible for promoting affordable housing
than communities with stable population? Whether viewed from the
perspective of households’ needs, housing’s cost, or municipalities’
culpability, there is no intuitively obvious reason why municipalities
with a growing population should have such a special obligation to
promote affordable housing. It is not obvious, for instance, that lowand moderate-income households especially want to live in growing
municipalities. Moreover, the cost of acquiring land for affordable
housing is likely to be higher in high-growth areas. Likewise, growing
municipalities have not necessarily thrown up more impediments to
affordable housing than municipalities that issue no new building
permits. What, then, is the normative basis for growth share?
The New Jersey Supreme Court has never provided a convincing
answer to that question. The Court has upheld municipalities’
imposing development fees on new non-residential development to
fund affordable housing on the theory that new employers attract

uncompensated expense of providing affordable housing is unlikely to result in
municipal zoning ordinances that make it realistically probable that the statewide
need for affordable housing can be met.”).
49. See John M. Payne, Lawyers, Judges, and the Public Interest, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 1685, 1693–97 (1998) (describing controversy over Cranbury Township being
required to host more than 4000 units, only 2444 of which were affordable units,
when the township’s original population was less than 2000 occupying only 750
dwelling units).
50. See Christopher Swope, Little House in the Suburbs, GOVERNING MAG., Apr.
2000,
http://www.governing.com/templates/gov_print_article?id=105880063.
(describing dependence of inclusionary zoning on demand for market-rate units).
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employees who bid up the price of housing, creating a special need
for affordable housing.51 There is some rough justice to such
“linkage” of housing obligations to employment. But why require
developers of new market-rate housing to bear the burden of
affordable housing? The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the
notion that “private developers . . . possess, enjoy, and consume land,
which constitutes the primary resource for housing,” thereby
increasing the costs of building affordable housing.52 This theory that
new market-rate housing increases the cost of affordable housing,
however, confuses cause and effect: if new housing is not built to
accommodate demand, then those new buyers will likely bid up the
cost of existing housing. To the extent that market-rate units absorb
housing demand that might otherwise buy up existing units, new
developments reduce rather than increase the need for lower-income
development.53
The justification for charging developers of new market-rate
housing with the cost of affordable housing is less a matter of
distributive justice than political economy. It is simply more
politically palatable for existing residents to saddle non-resident
homebuyers or owners of vacant land with the cost of redistributing
wealth to low- and moderate-income households. Developers who
51. Holmdel Builders Ass’n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 288 (N.J. 1990)
(“[T]here is a reasonable relationship between unrestrained nonresidential
development and the need for affordable residential development. We do not equate
such a reasonable relationship with the strict rational-nexus standard that demands a
but-for causal connection or direct consequential relationship between the private
activity that gives rise to the exaction and the public activity to which it is applied.
Rather, the relationship is to be founded on the actual, albeit indirect and general,
impact that such nonresidential development has on both the need for lower-income
residential development and on the opportunity and capacity of municipalities to
meet that need.”).
52. Id.
53. There is a plausible argument that new residential development might
increase housing demand if the occupants of the new development enhance demand
for neighboring lots more than the occupants of existing housing—say, by being
wealthier, more fashionable, or louder “squeaky wheels” with local politicians. The
theory that new luxury housing in low-income urban neighborhoods leads to
gentrification rests on the idea that demand for housing will increase if new and
wealthier neighbors arrive. See generally, Veronica Guerrieri et al., Endogenous
Gentrification and Housing Price Dynamics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 16237, 2010), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/erik.
hurst/research/gentrification_may25_2010_circulate.pdf. Such a theory, however,
does not fit the facts of new migrants’ occupying new developments in the suburbs,
because the new migrants typically are not notably more wealthy the existing
residents and do not increase the desirability of the suburban neighborhood.

HILLS_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1626

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

11/12/2013 11:16 PM

[Vol. XL

bear the cost of affordable housing can either pass that cost forward
to new homebuyers (if land within the jurisdiction is non-fungible and
demand, cost-inelastic) or backwards to the owners of vacant land (if
the land is fungible such that newcomers will not pay the extra cost).
Neither constituency is likely to be powerful in local politics—the
first, because they largely consist of non-residents, the second,
because they are likely to be isolated minorities in jurisdictions with
substantial numbers of homeowners.54 In this sense, Holmdel might
be correct in asserting that the development of new market-rate
housing could sometimes create “the opportunity and capacity of
municipalities to meet that need [for affordable housing]”55: charging
new housing with the cost of affordable housing is a politically
feasible way to redistribute wealth, while the outright taxation of
local residents for the same purpose would not be politically feasible.
Market-rate housing’s capacity to finance affordable units,
however, depends on the cost-inelasticity of demand for the former: If
it turns out that demand is soft, then developers will likely build fewer
units anticipating that buyers will refuse to cover the costs of fees or
in-kind dedications for affordable housing. Requiring new housing to
pay for affordable units, in short, is a hazardous undertaking that
requires a careful estimate of housing demand. The appellate
division recognized as much when it struck down COAH rules that
did not limit the discretion of municipalities to require developers to
pay for affordable housing, holding that such inclusionary
requirements could be effectively exclusionary if the municipality did
not create sufficient zoning incentives for developers to bear the costs
of the affordable units.56

54. For an account of the demographic changes from farmer-dominated politics to
homeowner-dominated politics that lead to downzoning of land, see Adesoji O.
Adelaja & Paul D. Gottlieb, The Political Economy of Downzoning, 38 AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. REV. 181, 194 (2009). On the political dominance of owners of
developed land in the zoning process, see Christian A.L. Hilber & Frédéric RobertNicoud, On the Origins of Land Use Regulations: Theory and Evidence from US
Metro Areas, 75 J. URB. ECON. 29 (2013).
55. Holmdel Builders Ass’n,, 583 A.2d 277 at 288.
56. In re Adoption of 5:96 & 5:97, supra note 48, at 461 (“Permitting
municipalities to demand that developers build affordable housing without any
additional incentives provides municipalities with an effective tool to exclude the
poor by combining an affordable housing requirement with large-lot zoning . . . . A
regulatory regime that relies on developers to incur the uncompensated expense of
providing affordable housing is unlikely to result in municipal zoning ordinances that
make it realistically probable that the statewide need for affordable housing can be
met.”).
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Growth share theories, in sum, do not avoid the empirical
difficulties of other unit-based attacks on exclusionary zoning.
Instead, these theories conceal such difficulties with apparently
simple ratios that disguise the tough choices and possibly harmful
consequences. It is not likely that judges and bureaucrats can easily
determine the “sweet spot” where mandates to create affordable
housing are not too expensive to avoid deterring market-rate
construction but also not so cheap that developers create affordable
housing insufficient to meet the regional need. Proponents of growth
share approaches to Mount Laurel have complained that COAH’s
version of growth share hijacked the idea for the goal of merely
reducing municipal obligations to promote affordable housing using
“manipulated data and tortured explanations.”57 This complaint is
accurate, but it is equally accurate to say that growth share lends itself
to being hijacked, because the task of calculating the proper ratios by
which to match affordable housing with growth is beyond the capacity
of courts to gauge.
The problem is not with growth share theories in particular but
rather with any unit-based approach in general. The basic difficulty
with all such theories is that they attempt to assign to judges and
bureaucrats the task of siting units in particular jurisdictions, a
function normally left to housing markets. Such a task requires
enormous amounts of information that courts and agencies cannot
easily collect or assess. As AMG Realty illustrates, judges are forced
to invent crude proxies for the nuanced considerations that influence
markets in assigning housing to places, proxies that are far from a
finely tuned balance of the innumerable factors—distance to work,
distance from friends and family, price, quality of policing and
schools, congestion and crowding, infrastructure and amenities,
availability of social support, and so forth—that guide housing
markets. Unit-based formulae, therefore, will always appear to have
a crude and bureaucratic rigidity—”some arbitrary, ridiculous
formula that nobody could ever explain,”58 as Governor Christie
complained.

57. Brief for Petitioner at 2, In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 by the N.J.
Council on Affordable Hous., 914 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (No.
A1960-04-T3).
58. Fleisher, supra note 1.
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III. A SOLUTION TO MOUNT LAUREL’S PROBLEMS? FOCUS ON
ZONING RESTRICTIONS
There is an alternative to unit-based approaches to exclusionary
zoning: rather than focus on the regional need for affordable housing,
the courts could instead focus on the municipal need for zoning
restrictions. More precisely, the courts could demand a more
substantial justification for the extraordinary restrictions that
municipal zoning imposes on residential uses.
There are remedial, normative, and informational advantages to
focusing on zoning restrictions rather than creating affordable
housing. As a remedial matter, zoning restrictions are fully within
municipal control, whereas housing rents are not: municipalities have
the power to fix the excessive restrictiveness of their zoning laws,
whereas they are not well-suited for redistributing wealth or financing
housing subsidies. As a normative matter, the focus on zoning
restrictions goes to the basis for municipal liability: municipalities
create neither poverty nor the housing demand that leads to
escalating rents, but municipalities do restrict housing supply with
excessive zoning. Finally, as an informational matter, it is much
simpler to fix a presumptive minimum zoned density for
municipalities than to regulate housing markets to match supply with
demand.
But would a restriction-based rule mitigate the political blowback
confronted by Mount Laurel’s unit-based strategy? This is a harder
question, because, as explained below, minimum densities might well
face as much or even more popular hostility than “fair share”
formulae. There are, however, some reasons, albeit uncertain and
here tentatively suggested, to believe that a restriction-based strategy
might have some political advantages over the unit-based strategy. In
any case, a combination of both might, if politically manageable, be
ideal.
A. The Proposal: A Presumptive Ceiling on Zoning
Restrictiveness
How might a focus on zoning restrictiveness change the character
of Mount Laurel? One simple approach would be to suspend
deference to municipal zoning restrictions whenever municipal zoning
exceeds a stipulated level of restrictiveness. Such a ceiling would not
be imposed on each lot within a municipality’s territory but instead
define an overall “zoning budget” that the municipality could allocate
freely over different parcels, allowing municipalities to severely
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restrict the use or density of some parcels just so long as the sum of all
such restrictions within the jurisdiction did not exceed the stipulated
regulatory level defined by the ceiling.59
This ceiling could be defined either as a required minimum
percentage of favored multi-family residential uses, expressed as a
percentage of dwelling units in multi-family structures, or as a
required minimum level of residential density, expressed as dwelling
units per acre. As an example of a minimum percentage requirement,
state law could presume that municipal zoning laws should
accommodate the same percentage of multi-family structures within
the municipality as the statewide percentage of housing units within
multifamily structures. In New Jersey, thirty-six percent of all
housing units consist of units in structures containing two or more
dwelling units.60 Using this figure as a ceiling on restrictiveness, local
zoning laws would have to allow thirty-six percent of the housing
within the municipality to consist of units in multi-family structures.
Alternatively, the law could define the ceiling in terms of an overall
residential density, requiring that municipal zoning laws allow a
minimum level of gross residential zoned density necessary to insure
that, in a jurisdiction of average housing demand, low- and moderateincome households could afford to rent or buy housing.
Consider the following illustration of how such a minimum zoned
density requirement might operate. “Ruralville” is a small township
containing five square miles or 3200 acres of land. The relevant state
agency decrees that, in order to avoid excessive restriction of housing
opportunity for all income levels, the zoning ordinance of all
municipalities should presumptively permit four dwelling units per
acre, including all land within the municipality however zoned or used
as part of the denominator except those lands outside municipal
control because of state environmental law.61 Ruralville’s zoning law,

59. For a discussion of “zoning budgets” in general, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr. &
David N. Schleicher, Balancing the “Zoning Budget”, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81
(2011).
60. Census of Housing, Historical Census of Housing Tables—Units in Structure,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/
units.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013).
61. For an account of the complexities of measuring residential densities, see ANN
FORSYTH, MEASURING DENSITY: WORKING DEFINITIONS FOR RESIDENTIAL DENSITY
AND BUILDING INTENSITY (2003), available at http://www.corridordevelopment.org/
pdfs/from_MDC_Website/db9.pdf; Vicky Cheng, Understanding Density and High
Density, in DESIGNING HIGH-DENSITY CITIES: FOR SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
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therefore, would presumptively have to allow 12,800 dwelling units to
be built unless the town could reduce its denominator by pointing to
land such as the Pine Barrens that were unbuildable under state law.
The town, however, could allocate these zoned units over different
parcels any way that it pleased—for instance, setting aside seventyfive percent of its land for single-family detached houses on one-acre
lots (thereby accommodating 2400 units of housing) while zoning only
ten percent of its land (320 acres) for higher-density apartments at
thirty-two dwelling units per acre. These zoned densities would not
have to result in actual construction, and Ruralville, if it liked, could
zone land for multi-family structures cumulatively for commercial or
industrial uses as well.
Construction of structures on such
cumulatively zoned lots would depend on the relative market for
commercial, industrial, or residential uses.62
To provide for some fine-tuning of the densities imposed by state
law, the density could be treated as a rebuttable presumption rather
than an absolute minimum. If Ruralville’s zoning did not meet the
state’s zoned density benchmarks, the developers seeking to build
housing at densities at or greater than four dwelling units per acre
could seek a builder’s remedy—a writ of mandamus—to build such
housing on any parcel within Ruralville. Ruralville could rebut the
presumption that such housing should be accommodated by
suggesting an alternative lot, either within Ruralville itself or in
another jurisdiction. In the latter case, Ruralville would be obliged to
join the other potential host jurisdiction as a co-defendant and bear
the burden of proving that that jurisdiction was a superior location for
the proposed housing. For instance, Ruralville could invoke the lack
of sewer and water lines at the site chosen by the plaintiff-developer
to rebut the presumption that the site should accommodate the
proposed residential use, but then Ruralville would have to prove by
the preponderance of the evidence that existing sewer and water lines
should not extended to the proposed site. If the utility service area
was
located
in
a
neighboring
jurisdiction—call
it
“Infrastructureville”—then Infrastructureville could be expected to
use its expert and attorney resources to defeat Ruralville’s case
SUSTAINABILITY 1, 4 (Edward Ng ed., 2012), available at http://arhitectura2tm.files.
wordpress.com/2012/09/understanding-density-and-high-density.pdf.
62. Lest one think that cumulative zones are anomalous, it bears mention that
cumulative zoning was the norm up through the 1950s. For the case against noncumulative industrial zones, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep
Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing,
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (2010).
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against extension, making an alliance with the plaintiff-developer. In
this way, the presumption would enlist developed jurisdictions to
promote densities in suburban areas and vice versa.
In suspending the deference that municipalities normally receive
for their zoning laws, the ceiling proposed here resembles the “antisnob land use laws” of Massachusetts,63 Connecticut,64 and Rhode
Island.65 All three of these statutes have the character of suspending
deference for zoning exclusions when less than ten percent of the
housing stock within the local government’s jurisdiction meets
affordability criteria satisfied by the proposed development.66 Unlike
these state laws, however, the ceiling here proposed would not
require that the proposed development charge “affordable” prices,
nor would the safe harbor for municipalities be defined in terms of
the affordability of housing within the municipality. Instead, the
focus would be exclusively on the restrictiveness of the zoning,
suspending deference for zoning laws that exceed a state ceiling on
regulatory severity. In this sense, the proposed ceiling would be
focused on what the Mount Laurel decisions call “least-cost
housing”67—that is, housing that can be constructed at the lowest
possible cost but, based on potential market demand, rented for more
than low- and moderate-income households could afford to pay.68
Unlike unit-based approaches to exclusionary zoning, such a ceiling
on zoning’s overall restrictiveness is practically easy to implement.
The data necessary to measure gross residential densities—that is, the
number of dwelling units within a particular geographic area minus
land outside municipal control—is readily available from the
Census.69 Likewise, the size of the municipal zoning “envelope”—

63. Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act, MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–
23 (LexisNexis 2006).
64. Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Act of 1990, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 830g (West 2010).
65. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-46.1 (2009).
66. For an overview of anti-snob land use laws, see Spencer M. Cowan, Anti-Snob
Land Use Laws, Suburban Exclusion, and Housing Opportunity, 28 J. URB. AFFAIRS
295 (2006).
67. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Twp. of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 1206–08 (N.J.
1977).
68. See id. (explaining the meaning of “least-cost housing”).
69. For simple step-by-step instructions on calculating gross residential densities,
see JULIE CAMPOLI & ALEX MACLEAN, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY,
VISUALIZING DENSITY WORKSHOP: STEPS FOR USING THE CENSUS 2000 TO MEASURE
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that is, the maximum number of dwelling units that can be built on a
particular lot consistent with the relevant zoning law—can be
calculated with GIS software.70 The simplicity of the data required by
such a ceiling on zoning restrictiveness is a consequence of the
modesty of the ceiling’s mission. Unlike unit-based approaches, the
point of the ceiling on zoning restrictiveness would not be to
guarantee that any particular amount of multi-family housing actually
would be constructed or that any level of residential density actually
would be achieved: the purpose of the ceiling, instead, would only be
the elimination of zoning barriers to housing. The actual construction
of the housing would depend on the market demand for the uses that
zoning allows but does not require.
Despite the proposed ceiling’s apparent modesty, the elimination
of low-density zoning could have dramatic effects on the price of all
housing. Limiting zoning restrictions can enlarge the quantity of
affordable housing even when the new developments prohibited by
the restrictions are not themselves affordable. Occupants of older
and cheaper housing can move into the new “least-cost” units,
thereby creating housing opportunities at the bottom of the housing
market when they vacate older and cheaper housing. As Quigley and
Raphael note, “the supply of bottom-quality housing is dependent on
new housing construction at all levels, not just newly built ‘affordable
housing.’”71 Measuring the precise magnitude of the deregulatory
effect is difficult, in part because there is no standard index of zoning
restrictiveness that allows inter-jurisdictional comparisons of

DENSITY (UNITS PER ACRE), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/
visualizing-density/census.pdf.
70. N.J. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ROUTE 1 REGIONAL GROWTH STRATEGY: FINAL
REPORT 22 (2010), available at http://policy.rutgers.edu/vtc/rgs/Final%20Report
%20Sept%2021%202010.pdf (describing use of GIS software to calculate “zoning
build-out” defined as “the theoretical maximum amount and type of new
development that would occur if development occurred on all developable land
according to its municipal zoning”). For an example of such calculations in New
Jersey’s Monmouth and Somerset Counties, see JOHN HASSE, ET AL., EVIDENCE OF
PERSISTENT EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS OF LAND USE POLICY WITHIN HISTORIC AND
PROJECTED DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS IN NEW JERSEY: A CASE STUDY OF
MONMOUTH AND SOMERSET COUNTIES (2011).
71. John M. Quigley & Stephen Raphael, Is Housing Unaffordable? Why Isn’t It
More Affordable?, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 205 (2008) (“[T]o the extent that cities
make it difficult to build new housing, any type of new housing, the availability of
low-cost housing will be reduced and the affordability of all housing will decline.”).
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restrictions’ effects on prices.72 The most recent and sophisticated
measures of regulatory restrictiveness indicate that the effect of
excessive regulation on the cost of housing is substantial.73
New Jersey, in particular, is afflicted with regulations that require
large amounts of land per dwelling unit, effectively foreclosing multifamily housing from much of the fastest growing parts of the state. In
the Route 1 area of New Jersey, for instance, sixty-two percent of the
residentially available land is zoned for densities of acre per dwelling
unit or higher, while eighty percent of such land is zoned at densities
of two dwelling units or less per acre.74 Given that multi-family
structures rarely provide a half-acre of land for each dwelling unit
contained within the structure, eighty percent of the most densely
populated and economically active territory within New Jersey is
likely off-limits to a type of housing occupied by a third of New
Jersey’s residents. Even relatively developed suburbs like Cherry Hill
have extraordinarily low gross densities of 1.7 dwelling units per
acre.75 A glance at Cherry Hill’s zoning map and measure of
residential density suggests the degree to which multi-family housing
has a tiny share of the jurisdiction’s land, surrounded by a sea of
single-family detached housing.76 In Monmouth County, only three
72. John M. Quigley & Larry A. Rosenthal, The Effects of Land-Use Regulation
on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?, 8 J. POL’Y.
DEV. RES. 69, 100 (2005).
73. A survey of over 2000 jurisdictions sponsored by the Wharton Business
School’s Zell/Lurie Real Estate Center provided a cross-jurisdiction dataset of
regulatory restrictiveness allowing inter-jurisdictional comparisons. See Joseph
Gyourko et al., A New Measure of the Local Regulatory Environment for Housing
Markets: The Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index, 45 URB. STUD. 693
(2008). Using this dataset, Theo Eicher found price effects of up to $200,000 per
dwelling unit resulting from land-use restrictions. See Theo Eicher, Housing Prices
and Land Use Regulations: A Study of 250 Major US Cities (May 2, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also Elizabeth Rhodes, UW
Study: Rules Add $200,000 to Seattle House Price, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008,
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2004181704_eicher14.html
(describing Professor Eicher’s analysis). Other measures of regulatory restrictiveness
have found substantial price effects associated with regulatory restrictiveness. See,
e.g., Edward Glaeser et al., Why Is Manhattan so Expensive? Regulation and the
Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J. L. & ECON. 331 (2005); Edward L. Glaeser & Bryce A.
Ward, The Causes and Consequences of Land Use Regulations: Evidence from
Greater Boston, 65 J. URB. ECON. 265 (2009).
74. N.J. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 70, at 22.
75. CHERRY HILL TWP. PLANNING BD., supra note 35, at 190.
76. DAVID J. BENEDETTI, TWP. OF CHERRY HILL DEP’T OF CMTY. DEV., ZONING
MAP 2007 (2007), available at http://nj-cherryhill.civicplus.com/DocumentCenter/
View/1754.
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percent of the remaining undeveloped land is zoned for densities of
more than two dwelling units per acre, meaning that ninety-seven
percent of the land precludes apartment or townhouse development.
Eighty percent of the land is zoned for fewer than one dwelling unit
per acre.77
In sum, one can imagine a deregulatory Mount Laurel doctrine,
one that would demand a more substantial justification for the
draconian municipal restrictions on residential uses.
Such an
approach could either supplement or replace Mount Laurel’s unitbased assessments of housing need.
B. Comparing Mount Laurel’s Fair Shares to a Ceiling on
Zoning Restrictiveness
How does such a restriction-based approach to exclusionary zoning
stack up, either as a matter of policy, politics, or law, when compared
to Mount Laurel’s efforts to assess the regional need for affordable
housing?
Consider, first, the comparative policy merits of these two methods
for fighting exclusion. As Part II argued above, the chief difficulty
with Mount Laurel, as a matter of policy, is that it makes excessive
informational and conceptual demands on judges and bureaucrats.
Public officials cannot calculate “fair share” obligations that capture
the true need for housing. They are, therefore, forced to rely on
crude proxies, the choice among which is essentially arbitrary. Such
proxies leave the public perplexed and give local officials strong
incentives to game the formulae to favor their own municipalities,
reproducing the very collective action problem that Mount Laurel
was intended to solve. Because of these political incentives, the
proxies that actually end up defining “fair shares” tend to
systematically understate the need for affordable housing. Mount
Laurel, for instance, admittedly undercounts housing needs by
excluding cost-burdened households from its definition of
substandard housing. Likewise, in calculating “present need,” both
AMG Realty and COAH’s rules also ignore the plight of persons in
structurally sound households but living in neighborhoods plagued by
high unemployment, high crime, and poor schools. These are merely
two examples of ways in which the unit-based formulae of Mount
Laurel are poor benchmarks for whether local zoning laws are

77. For examples of such calculations in New Jersey’s Monmouth and Somerset
Counties, see JOHN HASSE ET AL., supra note 70, at 18.
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excessively restrictive. As Part II notes, the catalogue of AMG
Realty’s flaws could be extended indefinitely. Moreover, the undercounting of “fair share” formulae extends to any unit-based system
for assigning specific types of housing to particular jurisdictions. The
informational demands of such systems are so great that the
assessments of how many units are needed will generally be
inaccurate, and the political competition for suburban votes will
insure that the numbers always come in on the low side.
If Mount Laurel simply endorsed the unit-based strategy of “fair
shares” as merely one tool with which to fight exclusionary zoning,
then these flaws would be pardonable: better low numbers than no
numbers, one might reasonably argue. Such low “fair shares” could
always be supplemented by the libertarian strategy of trimming back
on excessive regulation and thereby opening up the spigots of
downward filtering of existing housing. Mount Laurel, however, did
not embrace the unit-based strategy in such a partial way: Chief
Justice Wilentz arguably put all of his affordable housing eggs in one
“fair share” basket in Mount Laurel II, placating angry suburbs with
the soothing thought that, once they achieved the numbers demanded
by AMG Realty and, later, COAH, they would be off the hook and
could freely enact “large-lot and open space zoning, that would
maintain its beauty and communal character.”78 As Justice Skillman,
one of the three original Mount Laurel judges, noted in upholding a
township’s ten-acre minimum lot size, “under Mount Laurel II, once a
municipality discharges its obligations regarding housing for low and
moderate-income households . . . it has no constitutional obligation to
provide through zoning for a variety of other forms of housing.”79 On
this reading, Mount Laurel purchases political support for the “fair
share” obligation by foregoing other more libertarian attacks on
exclusionary zoning. This political calculation may have been
sensible: striking down excessively restricting zoning even after a
municipality ponied up their bureaucratically specified “fair share” of
affordable housing would likely be perceived as piling on. Given the
inaccuracy of the “fair shares” thus defined, however, the New Jersey
Supreme Court may have bet its political capital on the wrong horse.
What about the relative political merits of the unit- and restrictionbased theories? That is a much closer case: homeowners will
78. S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 390 (N.J. 1983).
79. New Jersey Farm Bureau v. Twp. of East Amwell, 882 A.2d 388, 394 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
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certainly object to minimum residential densities. The experience in
both Oregon and New Jersey suggests that such opposition can be
fierce and successful.80 There are, however, two reasons for believing
that density minimums may avoid some of the most intense aversion
to Mount Laurel.
First, in addition to the usual opposition that any new construction
might inspire among homeowners, “fair shares” of affordable housing
also attract the residual opposition to the fiscal collective action
problem described in Part I above that is especially salient when
prospective residents require more expensive services or live in less
expensive structures. Worries about “tipping” from one racial or
socio-economic group to another are exacerbated to the extent that
housing is reserved for lower-income groups. Precisely because
Mount Laurel focuses its attention on low- and moderate-income
housing, the doctrine would seem to be more prone to trigger these
fears more directly than a mere density minimum. As the late
Professor Payne argued, the theory requires recognition of a
“constitutional right to shelter and the governmental obligation to
meet the housing need to the maximum practicable extent . . . .”81
Such a right to shelter, however, faces the obstacle of stable public
opinion: while public opinion regarding welfare rights shifts over time
and in response to elite and media influence,82 there is plentiful
evidence that Americans consistently favor rights to minimum levels

80. In 2002, an organization called “Oregonians In Action” placed a ballot
initiative on the state-wide ballot to overturn the state Land Conservation &
Development Commission’s Metropolitan Housing Rule requiring minimum
residential densities within urban growth boundaries. The measure was defeated
only after supporters of the rule placed an alternative measure purporting to curb
density increases. See ANTHONY FLINT, THIS LAND: THE BATTLE OVER SPRAWL AND
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 202–03 (2006); Nancy Chapman & Hollie Lund, Housing
Density and Livability in Portland, in THE PORTLAND EDGE: CHALLENGES AND
SUCCESSES IN GROWING COMMUNITIES 206, 213–14 (Connie P. Ozawa ed., 2004). In
New Jersey, a proposal to require minimum residential densities died in the state
legislature in part because of opposition from South New Jersey representatives from
low-density counties who objected to the obligation to increase densities when their
housing was more affordable than denser jurisdictions in Northern New Jersey. To
view the withdrawn proposal, see S.B. 1, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010), available at
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/S0500/1_R3.pdf. For further discussion of this
topic, see Adam Gordon, The South Jersey S-1 Controversy, BLUE JERSEY (June 18,
2010), http://www.bluejersey.com/diary/15923/the-south-jersey-s1-controversy.
81. Payne, Reconstructing, supra note 2, at 576.
82. For an account of how elite and media opinion likely altered public support
for welfare rights during the 1990s, see Saundra K. Schneider & William G. Jacoby,
Elite Discourse and American Public Opinion: The Case of Welfare Spending, 58
POL. RES. Q. 367 (2005).
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of welfare only when these rights are conditioned on the recipients’
making good-faith efforts to obtain employment and achieve financial
independence, and they support constraints such as time limits on
those rights as ways to insure that the right-holders meet these
conditions.83
Unsurprisingly, in light of public hostility towards unconditional
welfare rights, Mount Laurel II defends a right to shelter that dare
not speak its name: Mount Laurel II self-consciously backs away from
any explicit defense of a right to shelter in favor of language calling
for a realistic “opportunity” for shelter.84 Mount Laurel II is reticent
not only in rhetoric but also in remedy: Mount Laurel II does not
require municipalities to raise revenue for affordable housing through
ordinary property taxation, even though such taxation would seem to
be “practicable.”85 Instead, Mount Laurel II compels only those
financing mechanisms that export burdens to non-residents or locally
weak owners of vacant land, such as inclusionary zoning or applying
for federal and state grants. According to Professor Payne, these
limits are the result of the justices’ recognition that “enforcement of a
broadly-stated constitutional right to shelter . . . would be well beyond
the practical capacity of the judicial system.”86 But the phrase
“practical capacity of the judicial system” here appears to be a
euphemism for “political acceptability of the entitlement.” This
tension between the rhetoric and the right undermines the legitimacy
of Mount Laurel. Indeed, to the extent that Mount Laurel is
explicitly framed as a constitutional right of the poor to a minimum
level of welfare, the doctrine triggers negative beliefs and stereotypes
that fuel opposition to affordable housing, such as the belief that the

83. For evidence from public opinion surveys regarding American attitudes
towards welfare rights, see STEVE FARKAS ET AL., THE VALUES WE LIVE BY: WHAT
AMERICANS WANT FROM WELFARE REFORM 16–20, 44–46 (1996); MARTIN GILENS,
WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF
ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS 2–8 (Susan Herbst & Benjamin Page eds., 1999).
84. See S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456 A.2d 390, 465
(N.J. 1983).
85. Southern Burlington discusses the required “affirmative measures.” Id. at
443–45, 456. While applying for available state and federal subsidies is among these
required measures, raising taxes to finance affordable housing is not.
86. Payne, supra note 2, at 567.
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poor “do not have a strong work ethic and prefer public assistance
over self-sufficiency.”87
By contrast, while minimum densities will certainly trigger the
usual NIMBY reaction to changes in the housing status quo, such
densities do not carry the extra baggage of welfare rights. The right
to be free from excessive regulation has been championed by opinion
leaders on the Right: Jack Kemp, President George Bush’s Secretary
of Housing & Urban Development, embraced the goal of breaking
down regulatory barriers to affordable housing.88 To be clear, New
Jersey homeowners are not likely to be swayed by abstract
considerations of ideology. But Republican leaders are more likely to
be swayed by considerations of abstract ideology than the rank and
file. By styling the right to be free from exclusionary zoning as a right
that applies to all housing types and not only income-constrained
housing, the anti-restriction theory also casts the housing question “as
an issue affecting all Americans” rather than an issue of importance
only to the poor, thereby avoiding stigmatizing stereotypes that
inflame homeowner opinion against affordable housing.89
There is a second structural reason why minimum densities might
be politically easier to implement than “fair shares” of actual units.
“Fair shares” require identification of specific “Mount Laurel units”
that must be built or rehabilitated in order to satisfy a municipal
obligation. By contrast, the minimum density does not require
specific developments to be proposed and sited. It requires only that
zoning be relaxed, a process that can occur through relatively diffuse
text amendments, such as adding apartments to industrial or
commercial zones or by changing the definitions of permissible
residential uses. Oregon’s experience provides anecdotal evidence
that such purely regulatory change, unconnected to specific groundbreakings, can be smuggled past neighborhood opposition for
extended periods of time. The Metropolitan Housing Rule only

87. Mai Thi Nguyen et al., Opposition to Affordable Housing in the USA: Debate
Framing and the Responses of Local Actors, 30 HOUSING THEORY & SOC’Y 107, 122
(2012).
88. See Jack Kemp, Mandate to the Commission, in ADVISORY COMM’N ON
REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUS., “NOT IN MY BACK YARD”:
REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991), available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/NotInMyBackyard.pdf.
89. Nguyen et al., supra note 87, at 112.
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generated serious neighborhood opposition in the mid-1990s, a
decade after it was promulgated.90
The claim that a density-based strategy will confront less political
opposition than the unit-based strategy, however, must be taken as a
hypothesis and not a proven fact. Incumbent landowners have strong
economic incentives to defend restrictive zoning to protect their
home values regardless of whether proposed housing is incomerestricted.91 Professor Payne is surely correct to note that an all-out
assault on zoning would likely fail, because “land use controls have
substantial social value in their own right” and are “not about to
wither away anytime soon in the modern state.”92 Any attack on
zoning restrictiveness, therefore, is politically feasible only if it is
temperate and limited, attacking only those restrictions that are the
product of the sorts of collective action problems described in Part I.
The anti-restriction theory outlined here attempts to meet these
requirements by giving municipalities broad latitude to apportion
their “zoning budget” across parcels as they please, by making the
ceiling on restrictiveness a rebuttable presumption, and by defining
the ceiling in terms of the state-wide mix of housing types.
C. Implementing a Ceiling on Zoning Restrictiveness
Through Filtering Credits
What legal basis could there be for imposing such a presumptive
ceiling on municipal zoning power? Ordinary constitutional theories
of substantive due process and statutory ultra vires theories have
limited value, because they generally require proof that a
municipality has singled out a neighborhood or landowner for
distinctively unfavorable treatment. Bailes v. Township of East
Brunswick93 illustrates this prohibition on “singling out.” In Bailes,
the plaintiffs challenged a special “rural preservation zone” that had
been imposed on mostly undeveloped lots in particular areas of the
township and that limited the development of such lots of six acres for
every residential dwelling unit while leaving place higher density

90. On the growth of neighborhood opposition in the mid-1990s over the planning
of Southwest Portland, see Bradshaw Hovey, Making the Portland Way of Planning:
The Structural Power of Language, 2 J. PLANNING HIST. 140, 147–57 (2003).
91. For the classic discussion of these incentives, see FISCHEL, supra note 23. For
recent empirical confirmation, see Hilber & Robert-Nicoud, supra note 54.
92. See Payne, supra note 2, at 574.
93. Bailes v. Twp. of E. Brunswick, 882 A.2d 395 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
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zoning for the balance of the township’s residents. In holding that the
zoning violated New Jersey’s Municipal Land Use law,94 Justice
Skillman relied heavily on the State Planning Commission’s “equity
policy,” because “[m]ost of East Brunswick, including substantial
parts of the RP zone, has been developed with residences on small
lots,” while “[p]laintiffs are a relatively small group of landowners
who have continued to farm and conduct other low-intensity uses of
their properties.”95
Focusing on the “singling out” of landowners by their neighbors is
useless against even-handed zoning that imposes low-density
restrictions on all or most residential uses within a jurisdiction. Such
laws do not involve intra-municipal exploitation of landowners by
their neighbors, but rather inter-municipal collective action problems.
Their flaw is not that they single out landowners within a municipality
for unfavorable treatment compared to the landowner’s neighbors
but rather that they inefficiently restrict residential uses beneath
levels that everyone would prefer if only they could coordinate their
zoning laws. To deal with such even-handed laws one needs a
doctrine similar to Mount Laurel in its focus on limiting the exclusion
of residential uses.
The state legislature of any state, of course, could authorize a
restriction-based strategy against exclusionary zoning similar to that
outlined here. Indeed, one legislature has already done so: The
Oregon state legislature has adopted planning statutes authorizing the
Oregon Land Conservation & Development Commission (LCDC) to
adopt land-use planning “goals,”96 and, pursuant to this mandate, the
LCDC has adopted Goal 10 on Housing, requiring local plans to
“encourage the availability of adequate numbers of needed housing
units at price ranges and rent levels which are commensurate with the
financial capabilities of Oregon households and allow for flexibility of
housing location, type and density.”97 Unlike Mount Laurel, Goal 10
is not focused exclusively on protecting the supply of housing
affordable by low- and moderate-income groups but instead requires
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West 2008)(“The zoning ordinance shall be
drawn with reasonable consideration to the character of each district and its peculiar
suitability for particular uses and to encourage the most appropriate use of land.”).
95. Bailes, 882 A.2d at 409.
96. See OREGON REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.040(2)(a) (West 2009) (“Pursuant to
ORS chapters 195, 196 and 197, the commission shall: (a) Adopt, amend and revise
goals consistent with regional, county and city concerns . . . .”).
97. OR. ADMIN. R. 660-015-0000(10) (2013), available at http://www.oregon.gov/
LCD/docs/goals/goal10.pdf.
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that municipalities accommodate all housing types at every income
level. Accordingly, the LCDC has construed Goal 10 in its
“Metropolitan Housing Rule” to require municipal zoning to
accommodate minimum levels of residential density such that smaller
cities must provide for an overall density of at least six units per acre,
medium-sized cities provide for at least eight units per acre, and that
the larger urbanized areas provide for at least ten units per acre.98
Unfortunately, Oregon’s system is also accompanied by aggressive
enforcement of urban growth boundaries that reduce the supply of
buildable land in suburban and rural areas.99 Those boundaries were
the quid pro quo by which advocates of “smart growth” in Oregon
persuaded environmentalists to support higher urban densities.100 As
a result, Oregon’s experience with increased densities is difficult to
compare to New Jersey’s experience with fair share. The evidence
suggests that Oregon’s system of smart growth performed worse than
New Jersey’s unit-based system in controlling housing costs,101
perhaps because the effects of urban growth boundaries cancelled out
the effects of higher densities. On the other hand, the LCDC’s rules
do not seem to have inspired the political resentment of COAH’s
rules, and unlike COAH, the LCDC enforces Goal 10 aggressively,
rejecting fifty-two of fifty-three plans submitted by cities with
populations over 5000 for failing to comply with Goal 10.102

98. OR. ADMIN. R. 660–007-0035 (West, Westlaw through Oregon Bulletin dated
July 1, 2013).
99. For an overview of Oregon’s system of urban growth boundaries and
mandated densities, see Edward J. Sullivan, The Quiet Revolution Goes West: The
Oregon Planning Program 1961–2011, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 357 (2012).
100. For a description of the alliance between environmentalists and developers
that created the urban growth boundaries in Oregon, see PETER A. WALKER &
PATRICK T. HURLEY, PLANNING PARADISE: POLITICS AND VISIONING OF LAND USE IN
OREGON 43–75, 114–18 (2011). For a general history of Oregon’s experience with the
urban growth boundaries, see PLANNING THE OREGON WAY: A TWENTY-YEAR
EVALUATION (Carl Abbott, et al. eds., 1994).
101. Oregon had a larger share of cost-burdened renter households than New
Jersey and added fewer rental units than New Jersey. GREGORY K. INGRAM ET AL.,
SMART GROWTH POLICIES: AN EVALUATION OF PROGRAMS AND OUTCOMES 78–79
(2009), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/Smart-Growth-Policies-Ch-6Affordable-Housing.pdf.
102. GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED LANDSCAPE:
LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON 80 (1992). The LCDC has
often used aggressive rhetoric in defense of its state housing goals. See, e.g., Seaman
v. City of Durham, Or. LCDC, No. 77-0925 (1978) (“Goal 10 speaks of the housing
needs of Oregon households, not the housing needs of Durham’s households. Its
meaning is clear: planning for housing must not be parochial. Planning jurisdictions
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Short of the New Jersey legislature’s improbably adopting a density
mandate similar to Oregon’s, is there anything that the New Jersey
courts or COAH could do to introduce a limit on the restrictiveness
of zoning laws within the framework set out by Mount Laurel and the
New Jersey Fair Housing Act? One possibility is to give “fair share”
credit to local governments who adopt higher overall residential
densities and promote multifamily housing, even when such housing
is not deed-restricted regarding the amounts for which it can be sold
or rented. The theory behind such credits is that new market-rate
housing would indirectly result in affordable units through downward
filtering.
Unfortunately, COAH has given filtering a bad name among
advocates of affordable housing.103 The New Jersey Appellate
Division has lent its authority to their criticisms of COAH by
invalidating COAH’s use of filtering calculations to reduce estimates
of total regional housing need. COAH assumed that some sound
housing units would become less expensive over time as they aged,
eventually becoming affordable to low- and moderate-income
households, allegedly resulting in 59,156 sound housing units
becoming affordable to low- or moderate-income households
between 1999 and 2014.104 Based on this estimate, COAH subtracted
59,156 units from the overall statewide projected need of 140,365
units. The appellate division rejected this theory by noting that
COAH produced no “data that would demonstrate whether, in 2004
or 2006, there exists an overall housing surplus in New Jersey, that
more houses are being built than households being formed, and that
housing with moderate operating costs is now being constructed.”105
In effect, COAH simply assumed that the supply market-rate housing
was somehow growing faster that housing need, creating automatic
filtering, without any proof that any municipality actually loosened up
the regulation of market-rate housing.
It would be unfortunate if COAH’s dishonest abuse of the filtering
concept led to its abandonment by the friends of Mount Laurel. If
must consider the needs of the relevant region in arriving at a fair allocation of
housing types. . . .”), quoted in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 785 (3d ed. 2005)
103. Alan Mallach, The Betrayal of Mount Laurel: Will New Jersey Get Away
with Gutting its Landmark Fair Housing Legislation?, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE
(March-April 2004), available at http://www.shelterforce.com/online/issues/134/
mtlaurel.html.
104. N.J. ADMIN. CODE. § 5:94, app. a, tbl.10, at 94-42 (2011).
105. In re Adoption of 5:94 & 5:95, supra note 5, at 371.
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deployed with integrity, filtering credits could provide an important
incentive for municipalities to deregulate their housing markets. The
critical problem with COAH’s use of filtering was that COAH
required nothing in return from municipalities in return for the
filtering reduction: the reduction was not a carrot but a gift. The
proper use of filtering would create an incentive for municipalities to
reduce regulation of market-rate housing by reducing the “fair share”
obligation only for those municipalities that amend their zoning laws
to meet state standards for minimum percentages of multifamily
housing and gross residential density. Those standards should be
stringent and data-driven. In return for any filtering credit, the state
ought to insist on zoned gross densities far higher than the one-acre
lot minimums that prevail in suburban New Jersey, and the state
should provide data that a such deregulation actually reduces housing
costs to the point where the bottom tier of existing housing will likely
filter down to low- and moderate-income households.
Such a use of filtering credits will prove controversial among
friends of Mount Laurel, because these credits reduce the obligation
to encourage the production of income-restricted units that Mount
Laurel’s advocates regard as the doctrine’s central purpose. But such
units are fragile benefits—beneficial to the lucky few who receive
them, but useless to the majority of New Jersey’s low- and moderateincome households who will inevitably be housed in filtered
structures. New Jersey’s median family income was $65,370 in 1999;
according to the 2000 Census, there were well over 300,000 families
making less than fifty percent of this income.106 By contrast, Mount
Laurel has been estimated to have made available only 60,731
affordable units,107 leaving much more than eighty percent of New
Jersey’s poor dependent on housing made available through means
other than Mount Laurel’s unit-based strategy.
Given these disparities, it may be worthwhile to sacrifice some of
those Mount Laurel units if such sacrifice will yield a substantial
deregulation of market-rate units. The informational burdens and
political turmoil from which Mount Laurel has suffered over its

106. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, NEW JERSEY: 2000, at 4 (2002) available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kprof00-nj.pdf.
107. Mount Laurel is estimated to have made available 60,731 affordable units
between 1980 and 2000. See STUART MECK ET AL., REGIONAL APPROACHES TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING 39 (2003).
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thirty-year history suggest, at least, that it might be worth giving an
anti-restriction based strategy a try.

